The central question that animates my research is how best to reconcile the possibility of freedom with our dependence on conditions that lie beyond our individual rational control and choice. Our care-providers, educators and the political communities into which we are born shape our emotions, preferences and character, which in turn guide the way we lead our lives. But if we have no control over the conditions in which our characters develop, how could we be said to be responsible for them?
My broadly Kantian perspective on the question grows out of my dissertation on Kant’s practical philosophy. I argued there that, contrary to received opinion, Kant’s practical philosophy provides us with the conceptual resources necessary to conceive of our emotions and character not as restrictions on human freedom, but rather as preconditions of its realization.
My current research divides into three parts. The first part grows out of my prior work on Kant’s conception of moral motivation, feeling and character. Building on that account, this work seeks to provide the basis for a novel Kantian understanding of the kind of failure that moral evil is—namely, the failure to acquire a good, stable moral character. The second part draws on this interpretation of moral failure and combines it with a Kantian understanding of practical self-consciousness, in order to contest contemporary accounts of the nature of moral self-opacity. The third part ties the forgoing strands together into an overarching conception of moral psychology—one that turns on a proper conception of the relation between moral habituation, education, and non-voluntaristic agency.
Publications
“Kant on Moral Self-Opacity,” forthcoming in European Journal of Philosophy (2020)
“Kant on Moral Respect,” forthcoming in Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie (2020)
“Evil or Only Immature? Reconciling Freedom and the Complexity of Moral Evil in Kant,” forthcoming in Rethinking Kant, Edgar Valdez, ed. (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Scholars Press, 2020)
“Desire: between Action and Passion,” forthcoming in Practical Reason: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives, James Conant and Dawa Ometto, eds. (Berlin: de Gruyter, 2020)
My broadly Kantian perspective on the question grows out of my dissertation on Kant’s practical philosophy. I argued there that, contrary to received opinion, Kant’s practical philosophy provides us with the conceptual resources necessary to conceive of our emotions and character not as restrictions on human freedom, but rather as preconditions of its realization.
My current research divides into three parts. The first part grows out of my prior work on Kant’s conception of moral motivation, feeling and character. Building on that account, this work seeks to provide the basis for a novel Kantian understanding of the kind of failure that moral evil is—namely, the failure to acquire a good, stable moral character. The second part draws on this interpretation of moral failure and combines it with a Kantian understanding of practical self-consciousness, in order to contest contemporary accounts of the nature of moral self-opacity. The third part ties the forgoing strands together into an overarching conception of moral psychology—one that turns on a proper conception of the relation between moral habituation, education, and non-voluntaristic agency.
Publications
“Kant on Moral Self-Opacity,” forthcoming in European Journal of Philosophy (2020)
“Kant on Moral Respect,” forthcoming in Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie (2020)
“Evil or Only Immature? Reconciling Freedom and the Complexity of Moral Evil in Kant,” forthcoming in Rethinking Kant, Edgar Valdez, ed. (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Scholars Press, 2020)
“Desire: between Action and Passion,” forthcoming in Practical Reason: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives, James Conant and Dawa Ometto, eds. (Berlin: de Gruyter, 2020)