

## Dr Anastasia Berg

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### Academic Employment

As of 2020	Assistant Professor, Department of Philosophy, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem
2020-2021	Mellon Postdoctoral Fellow in the Humanities, Wolf Humanities Center, the University of Pennsylvania (offered and accepted, participation withdrawn due to COVID-19)
2017-2020	Dorothy and Gaylord Donnelley Postdoctoral Junior Research Fellow in Philosophy, Corpus Christi College, The University of Cambridge

### Education

2017	Ph.D., The Committee on Social Thought and the Department of Philosophy, University of Chicago
2013	M.A., Committee on Social Thought, University of Chicago
2009	B.A., with Honors, in English and American Literature and Language, Harvard University

### Specialization

AOS	Kant, Moral Psychology (esp. Theory of the Emotions), Ethics
AOC	19 <sup>th</sup> Century German Philosophy, Ancient Philosophy, Early Modern Philosophy

### Publications

#### Articles

“Kant on Moral Self-Opacity,” *European Journal of Philosophy* (2020)

“Kant on Moral Respect,” *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie* (forthcoming, 2020)

“Evil or Only Immature? Reconciling Freedom and the Complexity of Moral Evil in Kant,” to appear in *Rethinking Kant*, Edgar Valdez, ed. (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Scholars Press, 2020)

“Desire: between Action and Passion,” to appear in *Practical Reason: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives*, James Conant and Dawa Ometto, eds. (Berlin: de Gruyter, 2021)

## Book

*What Are Children For?*, St. Martin's Press, forthcoming (2021)

A book analyzing the growing global ambivalence about childbearing, focusing on the moral and intellectual shifts that have occurred in how we think of the value and goodness of human life, and offering a contemporary, philosophical argument for why having children and starting families is not only justified but is good. The book is intended as a crossover book for both professional philosophers as well as those outside of professional academia. Co-authored with Rachel Wiseman. Under contract with St. Martin's Press. Forthcoming 2021.

## Reviews

Review of Melissa Merritt, *Kant on Reflection and Virtue*, in *British Journal of the History of Philosophy*, 2019

## Select Non-Academic Publications

TBD – Review of Kate Manne's *Down Girl* and *Entitled* to appear in *Chronicle of Higher Education Review*

"How to Reopen the American Mind," *The New York Times* (October 22, 2020)

"Now Is As Good a Time as Any to Start a Family," *The New York Times* (April 30, 2020)

"The Nature of Thought" (on Irad Kimhi's *Thinking and Being*), *Chronicle of Higher Education Review* (April 14, 2020)

"Giorgio Agamben's Coronavirus Cluelessness," *Chronicle of Higher Education Review* (March 23, 2020)

"Finite Variety: On Martin Hägglund's *This Life: Why mortality makes us free*," *The Times Literary Supplement* (October 1, 2019)

"On Choosing Life," *The Point* (September 7, 2019)

"The Case for Admissions Lotteries," *Chronicle of Higher Education Review* (September 13, 2019)

"Confession is Just a Special Form of Bragging: On Fleabag," *Los Angeles Review of Books* (July 30, 2019)

"On Left Straussianism," *The Point* (May 22, 2019)

"Fanning the Flames while the Humanities Burn," *Chronicle of Higher Education Review* (May 20, 2019)

"On Denialism," *The Point* (January 14, 2019)

"I Am Madame Bovary: 'Cat Person' and the Dark Pleasures of Empathy" *The Point* (April 23, 2018)

## Invited Talks

June 2020	TBD
	Colloquium, Department of Philosophy, The Hebrew University of Chicago

April 2020	TBD German Philosophy Workshop, University of Chicago
Jun 2020	CANCELLED DUE TO COVID-19 TBD, keynote The Loxbridge Kant Series, Oxford University
Apr 2020	CANCELLED DUE TO COVID-19 “Desire: Between Passion and Action” Moral Sciences Club, Cambridge University
Apr 2020	CANCELLED DUE TO COVID-19 “Kant and Moral Luck” German Philosophy Workshop, University of Chicago
Feb 2020	“Meritocracy and Higher Education,” Panel Discussion with Ross Douthat The UNC Program for Public Discourse, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill
Jan 2020	“Kant and the Freedom to Do What We Want” Colloquium Lecture Series, Central European University, Budapest
Jun 2019	“Self-Knowledge, Self-Deception and Self-Opacity” Stephen Hales Lecture Series, Corpus Christi College, Cambridge University
Mar 2019	“Kant on the Freedom to do Evil” German Philosophy Workshop, University of Chicago
Mar 2019	“‘Language is Critical’: On Irad Kimhi’s Radicalization of the Kantian Project” Workshop on Irad Kimhi’s <i>Thinking and Being</i> , University of Chicago
Dec 2018	“The Origin of Practical Reason in the Transcendental Power of Imagination: Heidegger on Kant” Conference on Neo Kantianism and Jewish Thought, Tel Aviv University
Dec 2018	“Overcoming the Opposition of Freedom and Nature in Kant’s Practical Philosophy: A Critique of the Incorporation Thesis” King’s History of Philosophy Seminar, King’s College London
Nov 2018	“Kant’s Feeling of Moral Respect as Practical Self-Consciousness” Kant’s Scots Seminar, Edinburgh University
Jun 2018	“Kant on The Human Capacity for Feeling,” Conference on Additive vs. Transformative Conceptions of Rationality, University of Patras
Jun 2018	“Evil or Only Immature? <sup>[1]</sup> Reconciling Freedom and the Complexity Of Moral Evil” Conference on Kant’s Religionschrift, Leipzig University
Jun 2018	“The Emotions as Modes of Practical Self-Consciousness” Philosophy of Mind Seminar, University of Cambridge
Jun 2018	“Kant’s Feeling of Moral Respect as Practical Self-Consciousness” Conceptions of Kantian Unity Workshop, University of Cambridge

- Feb 2018 “Kant on The Human Capacity for Feeling”  
Society of German Idealism and Romanticism, APA Session on Conceptions of Matter and Form, 2018 meeting of the Central Division of the APA
- Feb 2018 “Practical Reason in Kant: Self-Conscious or Self-Opaque?”  
German Philosophy Workshop, University of Chicago
- Feb 2018 “‘For All I know...’ On the Infallibility of Our capacity for Judgment”  
A Workshop on Andrea Kern’s *Sources of Knowledge*, University of Chicago
- Nov 2017 “Feeling and Absolute Value in Wittgenstein’s Lecture on Ethics”  
Robinson College, Cambridge University
- Jun 2017 “Feeling”  
Summer Conference on Irad Kimhi’s *Thinking and Being*, Leipzig University
- Jun 2017 “An Argument Against the Incorporation Thesis”  
Hylomorphism in Kant and German Idealism Workshop, Zentrum für Literatur- und Kulturforschung (ZfL), Berlin

### Refereed Conference Presentations

- Feb 2020 “Kant on Moral Self-Opacity”  
Symposium Presentation, 2020 APA Central Division Meeting
- Apr 2019 “Evil and the Problem of Moral Self Knowledge”  
British Society for the History of Philosophy Annual Conference, King’s College London
- Sep 2018 “Overcoming the Opposition of Freedom and Nature in Kant’s Practical Philosophy: A Critique of the Incorporation Thesis” UK Kant Society Annual Conference on “The Nature of Freedom and the Freedom of Nature”, Cardiff University
- Nov 2017 “Evil or Only Immature? Reconciling Freedom and the Complexity Of Moral Evil,”  
2017 Southern North American Kant Society Study Group, Tulane University
- Jun 2017 “You Can’t Move without Being Moved: On the Moral Significance of The Human Capacity for Feeling,” Leuven Kant Conference, KU Leuven
- Apr 2017 “You Can’t Move without Being Moved: On the Moral Significance of The Human Capacity for Feeling,” Eastern Study Group Meeting of the North American Kant Society, George Washington University
- Apr 2017 “Evil or Only Immature? On Acquiring Moral Character in Kant,” The Conference on the Problem Evil in European Modern and Contemporary Philosophy, Bishop’s University
- Mar 2017 “You Can’t Move without Being Moved: On the Moral Significance of The Human Capacity for Feeling,” The Northwestern Society for the Theory of Ethics and Politics (NUSTEP), Eleventh Annual Conference, Northwestern University

Jun 2016	“Moral Character, Kant’s <i>Gesinnung</i> and Aristotle’s <i>Hexis</i> ,” Summer Conference on the work of Aryeh Kosman, Leipzig University
Apr 2016	“How Can There Be Rational Feeling? Monistic Critique of the Incorporation Thesis,” The 2016 Graduate Philosophy Conference at UIUC
Mar 2016	“Making Sense of Kant’s Moral Respect: A Case for Non-Pathological Feeling,” Colloquium Presentation, 2016 APA Central Division Meeting
Sep 2015	“Kant’s <i>Gesinnung</i> as Aristotelian <i>Energeia</i> : the Deed Outside Time,” UK Kant Society Annual Conference jointly organized by North American Kant Society, on “Kant on Politics and Religion”
Jul 2015	“On The Unity of Sensibility and Reason in Practical Life in Engstrom’s Kant,” Summer Conference on the work of Stephen Engstrom, Leipzig University

### Commentaries

May 2016	Comments on Garrett Bredeson’s “Reinach, Natorp, and Early Phenomenology’s Engagement with the Kantian Tradition” North American Kant Society Third Biennial Meeting, Emory University (Invited)
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### Honours

Nov 2017	Travel Prize for best graduate student paper, Southern Reading Group, North American Kant Society (Candidate for the 2017 national Marcus Herz prize)
May 2017	Travel Prize for best graduate student paper, <sup>[1]</sup> Eastern Reading Group, North American Kant Society (Candidate for the 2017 national Marcus Herz prize)
2016-2017	William Rainey Harper Dissertation Year Fellowship Dissertation Completion Fellowship, University of Chicago
2016-2017	John U. Nef Fellowship, University of Chicago Dissertation Writing Fellowship (Declined)
2016	Graduate Student Travel Stipend to Central APA
2015-2016	John U. Nef Fellowship, University of Chicago Dissertation Writing Fellowship
2015	Division of the Social Sciences Summer Research Grant
2014-2015	Marshall and Deborah Wais Fellowship, University of Chicago Dissertation Writing Fellowship
2014	John U. Nef Summer Language Study Fellowship
2009-2014	University of Chicago Fellowship, University of Chicago Tuition and stipend for five years of graduate study
2011	John U. Nef Summer Language Study Fellowship

### Teaching at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem

F 2020	<i>The Meaning of Life and Death</i> Upper-level Undergraduate Seminar
S 2021	<i>Kant’s Practical Philosophy</i> Upper-level Undergraduate Seminar
S 2021	<i>The Emotions: Philosophy and Psychoanalytical Perspectives</i> Upper-level Undergraduate Seminar

## Teaching at the University of Cambridge

W 2020	<i>Moral Motivation</i> Advanced Undergraduates Lecture Series
F 2019	<i>Moral Responsibility</i> Advanced Undergraduates Lecture Series

*Supervision Topics include:* European Philosophy from Kant, Philosophy of Mind, Ethics

## Teaching at the University of Chicago

S 2016	<i>The Emotions: Philosophy and Psychoanalysis</i> Self-designed upper-level undergraduate course
W 2016	<i>Philosophical Perspectives on The Humanities II</i> Humanities Core Course: Early Modern Philosophy and Literature
F 2015	<i>Philosophical Perspectives on The Humanities I</i> Humanities Core Course: Ancient Philosophy and Literature

## Pedagogical Training (at the University of Chicago)

July 2016	<i>Seminar on Course Design</i> , Center for Teaching & Learning
Winter 2016	Individual Teaching Consultation, Center for Teaching & Learning Observed and taped by a professional teaching consultant
Mar 2015	<i>Climate-focused pedagogy workshop</i> : diversity and inclusion, Department of Philosophy,
Sep 2015	<i>Workshop on Teaching in the College</i> (for lecturers), Center for Teaching & Learning
Sep 2014	<i>Workshop on Teaching in the College</i> (for course assistants), Center for Teaching & Learning,
Spring 2013	<i>Pedagogies of Writing</i> , Writing Center, University of Chicago Quarter-long course on teaching effective writing in humanities core classes

## Courses Prepared to Teach

### *Introductory Undergraduate Courses*

Kant and Post-Kantian Philosophy  
Introduction to Ethics  
Introduction to Ancient Philosophy  
Introduction to Early Modern Philosophy

### *Advanced Undergraduate Courses*

Kant's Theoretical Philosophy  
Kant's Practical Philosophy  
The Emotions: Historical and Contemporary perspectives  
Moral Motivation  
Moral Responsibility  
Evil and Moral Failure

### *Graduate Courses*

Conceptualism vs Non-Conceptualism in Kant  
Kant on Practical Reason and Practical Sensibility  
Unity of Reason: Parallel Issues in Kant's Theoretical and Practical Philosophy

Neo-Kantian Accounts of Moral Motivation and Practical Agency  
Contemporary Theories of Desire  
Irad Kimhi's *Thinking and Being*

### **Service**

Article Referee for *Kantian Review*, *European Journal of Philosophy*, *Erkenntnis*, *Canadian Journal of Philosophy*

2018-	MA Thesis Examiner, Cambridge University
2018-	Undergraduate Philosophy Admissions, Cambridge University
2016-2017	Coordinator, German Philosophy Workshop, University of Chicago
2015-2017	Student Affairs Coordinator, Committee on Social Thought, University of Chicago Chair-student liaison, fielded prospective students' inquiries, coordinated visits, maintained department website
2014-2016	Coordinator, Committee on Social Thought Colloquium, University of Chicago Invited visiting speakers, students and faculty to present, made travel arrangements, organized dinners and receptions, advertised events

### **Graduate Advising**

MA Thesis Advisor: Eli Benjamin Israeli

### **Research Languages**

Native	English, Russian, Hebrew
Professional	German
Basic	Ancient Greek, Latin, French

### **Non-Academic Editorial Work**

Senior Editor for the *Point* magazine

## References

**Robert Pippin** (Dissertation Committee Chair)  
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Professor of Social Thought, Philosophy, and in the  
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**Lucy Allais**  
Henry E. Allison Chair of the History of Philosophy  
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**David Wellbery**  
LeRoy T. and Margaret Deffenbaugh Carlson  
University Professor in the Department of  
Germanic Studies, Comparative Literature,  
Committee on Social Thought, and the College  
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## Dissertation Overview

### *Freedom, Feeling and Character: The Unity of Reason and Sensibility in Kant's Practical Philosophy*

Kant's moral philosophy is often interpreted as turning on a sharp opposition between freedom and feeling. This interpretative line ignores two key moments in Kant's account where reason and feeling—activity and receptivity—are portrayed as interdependent constituents of a unified capacity to act well: the feeling of moral respect and the constitution of character. In each case the standard picture raises a puzzle about the text: First, how can moral respect be a feeling and yet be integral for rational motivation? And second, how can I be held responsible for actions that are grounded in character, something I don't choose or do in any ordinary sense? In answering these questions, it emerges that Kant is not only a forceful critic of a dualistic conception of reason and feeling but that he is moreover an insightful guide toward a coherent non-dualistic view of their relationship.

The dominant reception of Kant attributes to him an account in which we are essentially rational, free beings capable of self-determination, *and yet* are also subject to our feelings—the latter, products of nature and habituation, which are both outside of our “rational control.” This putative dualism, I argue in Chapter 1, is not only alien to our ordinary self-understanding but also threatens the internal coherence of the Kantian account. I examine the dominant interpretation of the relation between the rational will and feeling, namely, Henry Allison's Incorporation Thesis (endorsed by Guyer, Wood, Korsgaard and Baron, among others), according to which an agent is responsible for acting on contingent desire insofar as that agent has freely “incorporated” that desire into her principle of action by deeming the desire a reason to act. I argue however that as long as desire is understood as a brute fact, it cannot itself ever come to be considered as a reason to act. This reading, I argue, therefore leaves it mysterious how agents can be said to freely act on their desires, and therefore be responsible for acting morally badly.

While commentators have previously considered that the feeling of moral respect might hold the key to Kant's understanding of the relation between reason and feeling, I argue that they have nevertheless failed to appreciate what is philosophically most distinctive and profound in Kant's account of the role of feeling in the life of a practically rational agent. In Chapter 2, I argue that implicit in Kant's account of the feeling of moral respect is the remarkable idea that human emotion is a unique mode of self-consciousness, one which discloses the subject to herself as rational, embodied and capable of freely determining herself to act in the world. Human feeling emerges on this account as the form of self-consciousness *constitutive of practical agency*, i.e., of freedom.

This reading of moral respect opens a new perspective on the topic of *moral character*. On standard accounts of Kant's practical philosophy character is interpreted as an aggregate of dispositions to act that result from mere empirical habituation. This renders mysterious how character is supposed to play the role that it does on Kant's account: as the object of moral valuation. I argue in Chapter 3, that character is instead the *activity* of maintaining oneself as a self-conscious practical agent. I further argue that maintaining one's practical self-consciousness depends on the cultivation of capacities for feeling. This is why, I conclude, Kant can claim that the cultivation of a capacity for moral feeling is a necessary condition of our being subject to the demands of reason. Finally, in Chapter 4, I attend to the apparent tension between Kant's rigorism—the claim that an agent is of either wholly good or wholly evil character—and his nuanced account of the grades of moral imperfection. To do this, I argue, we must recognize the *acquisition* of moral character as a form of rational accomplishment: the development and determination of our rational capacities for feeling.

The resulting account of feeling and moral character does not only resolve the problem of moral motivation that has vexed much Kant commentary, it also offers an account of practical cognition according to which nothing could be further from the truth than the idea that our capacity of feeling is a threat to our freedom and an obstacle to ethical life; feeling, instead, is the manifestation of reason in human beings, the rational, finite and dependent beings that we are.