

# Anastasia N Artemyev Berg

Committee on Social Thought  
and the Department of Philosophy  
University of Chicago  
1130 East 59<sup>th</sup> Street  
Chicago, IL 60637

(+1) 617 955 2206  
[anaberg@uchicago.edu](mailto:anaberg@uchicago.edu)  
<http://anastasiaberg.com>

## Education

2017	PhD, Joint Degree with the Committee on Social Thought and the Department of Philosophy, University of Chicago (expected June 2017)
2013	MA Committee on Social Thought, University of Chicago
2009	BA with Honors in English and American Literature and Language, Harvard University

## Specialization

AOS	Kant, Ethics, Moral Psychology (esp. Theory of the Emotions).
AOC	19 <sup>th</sup> Century German Philosophy, Ancient Philosophy, Philosophy of Psychoanalysis

## Dissertation

Title Committee	<i>The Unity of Reason and Sensibility in Kant's Practical Philosophy</i> Robert Pippin (Chair), James Conant, Matthew Boyle, Stephen Engstrom
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Abstract	The standard reading of Kant's moral philosophy leaves us with an irreducible dualism between reason and feeling. I argue however that Kant is in fact one of the most insightful guides toward a coherent non-dualistic view of the relationship between reason and feeling. On my interpretation of Kant's account, feeling emerges not as a threat to our freedom and an obstacle to ethical life, but a necessary condition of both. To demonstrate this, I look to Kant's answer to the question of how reason <i>motivates</i> the individual subject in its two guises: first, in its familiar guise, in his account in his treatment of moral respect, and, second, in its less well-known guise, in his account of moral character. I argue that moral respect does not name one particular kind of feeling among many, but names the <i>human</i> capacity for feeling. It further emerges that the distinctive human capacity for feeling is a form of self-consciousness <i>constitutive of practical agency</i> : this is the way in which we come to know ourselves as practically rational, recognize our fellow human beings as such, and thereby relate practically to the activities and projects that constitute the world we hold in common. This reading of moral respect opens an entirely new perspective on moral character. In particular, drawing on Aristotelian characterization of capacities and activities, I argue that character is an <i>activity</i> in which we maintain a practical self-understanding of ourselves as rational, embodied, efficacious agents. Moral respect and moral character thereby reveal that our capacities to feel do not oppose, but rather constitute the very flesh and bones of our practical embodiment of reason.
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## Presentations

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| June 2016  | Moral Character, Kant's <i>Gesinnung</i> and Aristotle's <i>Hexis</i> . Summer Conference on the work of Aryeh Kosman, Leipzig University. (Refereed)   |
| April 2016 | "How Can There Be Rational Feeling? Monistic Critique of the Incorporation Thesis," The 2016 Graduate Philosophy Conference at UIUC. (Refereed)   |
| Mar 2016   | "Making Sense of Kant's Moral Respect: A Case for Non-Pathological Feeling," 2016 APA Central Division Meeting. (Refereed. Winner of a graduate student travel stipend)   |
| Sept 2015  | "Kant's <i>Gesinnung</i> as Aristotelian <i>Energeia</i> : the Deed Outside Time," UK Kant Society Annual Conference jointly organized by North American Kant Society, on "Kant on Politics and Religion." (Refereed) |
| Jul 2015   | "You Can't Move without being <i>Moved</i> : On The Unity of Sensibility and Reason in Practical Life in Engstrom's Kant," Summer Conference on the work of Stephen Engstrom, Leipzig University. (Refereed)          |

## Commentaries

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| May 2016 | Comments on Garrett Bredeson's "Reinach, Natorp, and Early Phenomenology's Engagement with the Kantian Tradition." North American Kant Society Third Biennial Meeting, Emory University. (Invited) |
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## University Workshop Presentations

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| May 2017 | "Habit and Responsibility, An Aristotelian Proposal," Practical Philosophy Workshop, University of Chicago  |
| Apr 2017 | "Evil or Only Immature? On Acquiring Character in Kant," German Philosophy Workshop, University of Chicago  |
| Jun 2016 | "The Unity of Logos and Erōs in Plato's Phaedrus—The unity of Soul and Body of a Living Being," Literature and Philosophy Workshop, University of Chicago |
| Mar 2016 | "Imputation of Moral Constitution," Practical Philosophy Workshop, University of Chicago.   |
| Nov 2015 | "Moral Respect, A Case for Non-Pathological feeling," German Philosophy Workshop, University of Chicago.  |

## Honours

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|-----------|---|
| 2016-2017 | William Rainey Harper Dissertation Year Fellowship<br>Dissertation Completion Fellowship, University of Chicago |
| 2016-2017 | John U. Nef Fellowship, University of Chicago<br>Dissertation Writing Fellowship (Declined)                     |
| 2016      | Graduate Student Travel Stipend to Central APA  |
| 2015-2016 | John U. Nef Fellowship, University of Chicago<br>Dissertation Writing Fellowship                                |
| 2015      | Division of the Social Sciences Summer Research Grant   |
| 2014-2015 | Marshall and Deborah Wais Fellowship, University of Chicago<br>Dissertation Writing Fellowship                  |
| 2014      | John U. Nef Summer Language Study Fellowship  |
| 2009-2014 | University of Chicago Fellowship, University of Chicago   |

2011 | Tuition and stipend for five years of graduate study  
John U. Nef Summer Language Study Fellowship

## Teaching Experience

### *Stand-alone Instructor*

W 2017 | *Women and Madness: Philosophy, Literature and Psychoanalysis*  
Self-designed upper-level undergraduate course, listed in departments of: Philosophy  
S 2016 | *The Emotions: Philosophy and Psychoanalysis*, University of Chicago  
Self-designed upper-level undergraduate course, listed in departments of: Philosophy, and  
Comparative Human Development.  
W 2015 | *Philosophical Perspectives on The Humanities II:*, University of Chicago  
Humanities Core Course: Early Modern Philosophy and Literature  
F 2015 | *Philosophical Perspectives on The Humanities I:* University of Chicago  
Humanities Core Course: Ancient Philosophy and Literature

### *Course Assistant*

S 2015 | *Introduction to Ethics*  
Course Assistant for Professor Ben Callard  
W 2014 | *Greek Thought and Literature II*, University of Chicago  
Writing Intern for Prof. Alain Bresson  
Designed seminars on academic writing for first-year college students, in conjunction with  
a Humanities Core course, and graded student papers  
S 2013 | *Philosophical Perspectives on The Humanities III*, University of Chicago  
Writing Intern for Prof. Anubav Vasudevan  
Designed seminars on academic writing for first-year college students, in conjunction with  
a Humanities Core course, and graded student papers  
W 2013 | *Human Being and Citizen II*, University of Chicago  
Writing Intern for Prof. Justin Steinberg  
Designed seminars on academic writing for first-year college students, in conjunction with  
a Humanities Core course, and graded student papers  
W 2010 | *Classics of Social and Political Thought II*, University of Chicago  
Course Assistant for Dr. Mara Marin  
S 2011 | *Classics of Social and Political Thought III*, University of Chicago  
Course Assistant for Prof. Lisa Wedeen

## Pedagogical Training

July 2016 | Seminar on Course Design, Center for Teaching & Learning, University of Chicago  
Winter 2016 | Individual Teaching Consultation, Center for Teaching & Learning, University of Chicago  
Observed and taped by a professional teaching consultant, met individually to receive feedback  
and pedagogical advice.  
Mar 2015 | *Climate-focused pedagogy workshop: diversity and inclusion.* Philosophy Department,  
University of Chicago  
Sep 2015 | *Workshop on Teaching in the College*, Center for Teaching & Learning, University of Chicago  
Two-day intensive training for serving as a lecturer in undergraduate classes  
Sep 2014 | *Workshop on Teaching in the College*, Center for Teaching & Learning, University of Chicago  
Two-day intensive training for serving as a teaching assistant in undergraduate classes

Spring 2013 | *Pedagogies of Writing*, Writing Center, University of Chicago  
 Quarter-long course on teaching effective writing in humanities core classes

### Service

2015-2016 | Student Affairs Assistant, Committee on Social Thought  
 Chair-student liaison, fielded prospective students' inquiries, coordinated visits, maintained department website.

2014-2016 | Coordinator, Committee on Social Thought Colloquium  
 Invited visiting speakers, students and faculty to present, made travel arrangements, organized dinners and receptions, advertised events.

### Research Languages

Native | English, Hebrew, Russian  
 Professional | German

### Non-Academic Editorial Work

Associate Editor for the Point Magazine

### Graduate Coursework (\* denotes audit)

Ancient Philosophy	Plato, <i>Laws</i> : N. Tarcov (A 09) Plato's Aesthetics: G. R. Lear (A 09)* Plato on Beauty and Truth: G. R. Lear (A 12)* Plato's <i>Sophist</i> : I. Kimhi (W12)*
Philosophy of Mind	Self-Consciousness / Unconsciousness: J. Lear & S. Rödl (W 10)* Subjects, Consciousness and Self-Consciousness: C. Peacock (W 11)* Thinking and Being I: I. Kimhi (W 12)* Thinking and Being II: I. Kimhi (S 12)* Language and Self-Consciousness: D. Finkelstein & I. Kimhi (S 14)* Theories of Judgments and Propositions (W 14)*
Kant and 19 <sup>th</sup> C. German philosophy	Kant's Ethics: C. Vogler (A 10) History of Philosophy, Kant and the 19 <sup>th</sup> Century: M. Forster (S 10)* Kant's Transcendental Deduction: R. Pippin & J. Conant (S 10) Practical Reason: S. Engstrom (W 14)* Hegel's <i>Science of Logic</i> : R. Pippin (W 12) Hegel's <i>Science of Logic</i> : R. Pippin (W 14)* Hegel's <i>Science of Subjective Logic</i> : R. Pippin (W 15)* Birth and Death of the Metaphysical Proof of the Existence of God, Descartes and Kant: J. L. Marion (S 10)*
Analytic Philosophy	Wittgenstein's Later Philosophy: D. Finkelstein (S 11) Wittgenstein's <i>Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus</i> : J. Conant (W 12)* Wittgenstein's <i>Philosophical Investigations</i> : I. Kimhi (A 14)* Forms of Philosophical Skepticism: J. Conant (W 11)

## References

**Robert Pippin** (Dissertation Committee Chair)

Evelyn Stefansson Nef Distinguished Service Professor of Social Thought, Philosophy, and in the College  
University of Chicago  
[r-pippin@uchicago.edu](mailto:r-pippin@uchicago.edu)

**James Conant** (Dissertation Committee member)

Chester D. Tripp Professor of Humanities, Professor of Philosophy, and Professor in the College  
University of Chicago  
[jconant@uchicago.edu](mailto:jconant@uchicago.edu)

**Matthew Boyle** (Dissertation Committee member)

Professor of Philosophy  
University of Chicago  
[mbboyle@uchicago.edu](mailto:mbboyle@uchicago.edu)

**Stephen Engstrom** (Dissertation Committee member)

Professor of Philosophy  
University of Pittsburgh  
[engstrom@pitt.edu](mailto:engstrom@pitt.edu)

**David Wellbery**

LeRoy T. and Margaret Deffenbaugh Carlson University Professor in the Department of Germanic Studies,  
Comparative Literature, Committee on Social Thought, and the College  
University of Chicago  
[wellbery@uchicago.edu](mailto:wellbery@uchicago.edu)

**Irad Kimhi**

Associate Professor John U. Nef Committee on Social Thought and the College  
University of Chicago  
[ikimhi@uchicago.edu](mailto:ikimhi@uchicago.edu)

**Jason Bridges** (teaching reference)

Associate Professor of Philosophy  
University of Chicago  
[bridges@uchicago.edu](mailto:bridges@uchicago.edu)

## Dissertation Overview

### Title: *The Unity of Reason and Sensibility in Kant's Practical Philosophy*

Kant's moral philosophy is often interpreted as turning on a sharp opposition between freedom and feeling—reason and inclination. I argue in my dissertation that not only is this a misreading of Kant, but that he, properly read, is one of the most forceful critics of such a dualistic conception of our practical cognitive capacities and is moreover an insightful guide toward a coherent non-dualistic view of this relationship.

The dominant reception of Kant attributes to him a picture in which we are essentially rational, free beings capable of self-determination, *and* yet also are at subject to our feelings—forces produced by nature and habituation, outside of our rational control. On this interpretation, Kant is but one more proponent, albeit a very influential one, of the traditional view that emotions are irrational and therefore at best a matter of indifference and at worst an obstacle to a life of freedom and rationality.

This putative dualism, I argue in Chapter 1, is not only alien to our common ways of self-understanding but it threatens the internal coherence of the Kantian account. It renders incoherent the idea that we can incorporate the pursuit of the objects of our emotions, i.e., of our particular concerns, into even morally permissible actions, and, most gravely, it renders unintelligible the idea of moral motivation itself: In a picture where our affective lives are divorced from our lives as free and rational beings, it becomes impossible to see how a concern with the right thing to do could ever *per se* be what *moves* us to act.

Twentieth-century scholars sympathetic to Kant's account of morality, believing it to be the only account capable of securing *objective universal* moral claims, tried to resist this picture of Kant by rehabilitating Kant's treatment of human feeling. Specifically, commentators have recognized that the feeling of moral respect holds the key to Kant's understanding the relation of reason and feeling in Kant. I argue that the manner in which they have attempted to spell out the role of respect in Kant's practical philosophy nevertheless completely fails to appreciate what is philosophically most distinctive and profound in Kant's account of the distinctive role of feeling in the life of a practical rational agent.

In Chapter 2, I argue that implicit in Kant's account of the feeling of moral respect is the remarkable and previously unrecognized idea that human emotion is a unique mode of self-consciousness—of self-revelation and self-understanding—one which discloses the subject to herself as rational, embodied and capable of freely determining how she acts in the world. Human emotion, the distinctive human capacity for feeling, emerges on this account as the form of self-consciousness *constitutive of practical agency*, i.e., of freedom.

This reading of moral respect opens an entirely new perspective on the topic of *moral character*. On standard accounts of Kant's practical philosophy character is interpreted as an aggregate of dispositions to act that are due to forms of mere empirical habituation. This renders completely mysterious how character is supposed to play the role that it does on Kant's account. I argue in Chapter 3, drawing on an Aristotelian understanding of the logical structure of capacities and activities, that character is rather the *activity* of maintaining one's identity as a practical agent. In Chapter 4, I go on to argue that maintaining a practical self-understanding is grounded, in turn, in the cultivation of capacities for feeling which reflect and reveal our understanding of ourselves as rational. They thereby constitute a necessary condition of our being subject to the demands of reason. Finally, I argue that the idea of the *acquisition* of character must play a wholly different role in Kant's practical philosophy than that accorded to it on standard readings. In my reading, the acquisition of character emerges as a rational accomplishment: the development and determination of our uniquely rational capacities for feeling.

The resulting account of feeling and moral character not only resolves the problem of moral motivation that has also vexed much Kant commentary but offers an understanding of practical cognition in which nothing can be further from the truth than the idea that our capacity of feeling is necessarily a threat to our freedom and an obstacle to ethical life. On the contrary, it emerges as a necessary condition of both.